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JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE TRADING
WITH THE ENEMY ACT-t
Joseph W. Bishop, Jr.*
T HE Trading with the Enemy Act has in modern economic
warfare two basic objectives: to keep an enemy from using
for his own purposes any property which he owns or controls,
located within the United States; and to make that same property
available for the purposes of the United States. Essentially
simple as are these purposes, the Act - perhaps because loosely
and hastily drafted - has presented to the judiciary a collection
of knotty problems which are probably not surpassed by those
arising under any other statute of its size and weight. It is the
aim of this article to discuss some of those problems.
The first purpose, essentially defensive, has been accomplished
principally by "freezing" controls. Freezing, unlike vesting, did
not change the ownership of the property affected, but simply
prohibited and declared void transfers not licensed by the Treas-
ury.' The constitutionality of such prohibition and nullification
t In addition to the usual warning that the opinions expressed herein are not
necessarily those of the Department of Justice, the author cautions readers that
he has been largely responsible for the appellate litigation of some of the cases dis-
cussed herein, particularly Clark v. Manufacturers Trust Co. and Matter of Herter,
and so has a certain, perhaps inevitable, bias.
This article avoids, insofar as possible, detailed discussion of the history of
the Trading with the Enemy Act. An excellent symposium on this and allied topics
is contained in ii LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 1-199 (1945).
* Attorney, Office of Alien Property, Department of Justice.
'The basic statutory authority for these controls is § 5(b) of the Trading
with the Enemy Act, 40 STAT. 415 (1917), as amended, 5o U. S. C. App. § 5(b)
(X946). The basic Executive Order, frequently amended to extend the controls, is
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of transfers of foreign-owned property is no longer open to ques-
tion, and in general the courts have accorded to freezing orders
the full effect intended by the legislative and executive branches
of the Government.2 The freezing program, by subjecting to
licensing and consequent strict scrutiny transactions affecting
property in the United States in which foreign countries (allied
and neutral as well as enemy) or their nationals had an interest,
not only prevented the Axis from using its own property in the
United States as a means of obtaining credit and foreign exchange
but, more important, seriously interfered with its plans for the
looting- of conquered countries. Without the freezing controls,
utilization of dollar assets belonging either to the Axis, its na-
tionals, or its victims would have presented few difficulties to the
acute financial intellects in the German Devisenabteilung of the
Reich Economics Ministry and their Japanese opposite numbers.
The imposition of "occupation costs" or the simple pointing of a
gun could secure the transfer of interests in American property
to the Axis; "evidences of ownership" so obtained could easily
have been exchanged in neutral countries for "hard money." As
it was, few neutrals cared to speculate in evidences of ownership
which American law declared null and void.
At its peak, the program affected property valued at nearly
eight billion dollars;' but it is being terminated as rapidly as
possible, the general policy being either to unfreeze the assets
altogether or, if they have a genuine enemy taint, to vest them in
Exec. Order No. 8389, 3 CODE FED. REos. 645 (Cum. Supp. 1943) (issued April io,
1940). For a comprehensive collection of Executive Orders, General Rulings, Gen-
eral Licenses and other regulations under the freezing program see DocUarxNTS
PERTAINING TO FOREIGN FuNDs CONTROL (U. S. Treas. Dep't 1946).
2 Bg., Silesian-American Corp. v. Clark, 332 U. S. 469 ('947) ; United States v.
Von Clemm, 136 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U. S. 769 (1943);
Clark v. Propper, 169 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1948). Some question has arisen in the
courts of New York as to the effect of these regulations on transfers by judicial
process, such as attachment or the appointment of a receiver. Cf. Singer v. Yoko-
hama Specie Bank, 293 N. Y. 542, 58 N. E.2d 726 (z944). The Singer case has
been criticized by commentators, see Berger and Bittker, Freezing Controls: The
Effects of an Unlicensed Transaction, 47 COL. L. Rzv. 398 (1947), and rejected
by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Clark v. Propper, supra. See
also Clark v. Chase Nat. Bank, S. D. N. Y., Oct. 1, 1948. The Supreme Court has
granted certiorari in the Propper case, and it is possible that such conflict as there
is between the federal courts and those of New York may be resolved.
3 See ANNUAL REPORT, OSTICE OF ALIEN PROPERTY CUSTODIAN, FIscAL YEAR
ENDING JUNE 30, 1944, I4; H. R. REP. No. 1507, 77th Cong., ist Sess. 2-3 (1941).
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TRADING WITH THE ENEMY ACT
the Alien Property Custodian.' With the end of shooting war
and the gradual return of more or less normal economic condi-
tions, the practical significance of the freezing program to the
lawyer decreases, and it will consequently not be included within
the scope of this article.5
The vesting of property by the Alien Property Custodian
achieves the second, or offensive (in the military sense), purpose
of the Trading with the Enemy Act - the seizure and utilization
of enemy property "in the interest of and for the benefit of the
United States." It accomplishes this sweeping objective by trans-
ferring the ownership of the property to the United States, there
to remain unless the former owner can fit himself into one of the
sections of the Act which provide for return. It will be noted
that the scope of the vesting power is considerably narrower
than that of the regulatory power, for the latter covers any
property in which a foreign national has any interest, while
the former extends only to the foreign interest itself 6 and, in
practice, only to enemy interests.
The value of the property directly affected by the vesting pro-
gram, while small by comparison to the sums frozen, can hardly
be described as piddling. As of June 30, 1947, the Custodian had
vested German and Japanese property valued at $266,oI7,000
and had estimated the value of such property not yet vested to be
somewhere between $88,500,000 and $io3,5oo,ooo.5 These fig-
ures are, however, deceptively low, for they take no account of
thousands of copyrights and patents - as, for example, the basic
' This policy was expressed in detail in a letter from the Secretary of the Treas-
ury to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs. See N. Y. Times,
Feb. 3, 1948, p. z, col. 6. By Exec. Order No. 9989, 13 FED. REG. 4891 (1948)
(issued August 20, 1948), hdministration of the freezing program was transferred
to the Attorney General, as successor to the Alien Property Custodian.
a For a general survey of the wartime operation of the freezing program, see
Reeves, The Control of Foreign Funds by the United States Treasury, ii LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 17 (1945).
'See Clark v. Edmunds, 73 F. Supp. 390 (W. D. Va. 1947); cf. Clark v.
Uebersee Finanz-Korporation, 332 U. S. 480 (1947), discussed pp. 749-So infra.
"7ANNUAL REPORT, OFFICE OF ALIEN PROPERTY, DEPARTUEMNT OF JUSTICE, FiscAL
YR ENDING JUNE 30, 1947, 3. The value of vested Italian property never ex-
ceeded $18,ooo,ooo, and its return has now been authorized by Congress. Id., at
8-9; Pub. L. No. 37o, 8oth Cong., ist Sess. (Aug. 5, 1947). Bulgarian, Hungarian,
and Rumanian property vested totaled only about $5,ooo,ooo. ANuAL REPORT,
supra at I8.
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HARVARD LAW REVIEW
patents of I. G. Farben in the synthetic rubber industry 8 - the
dollar value of which the Custodian has preferred not to estimate,
but which is undoubtedly substantial. 9
Having said so much by way of preface, we may now examine
in more detail some of the more important and vexing problems
which have arisen out of the Custodian's exercise of the vesting
powers conferred on him by the Trading with the Enemy Act and
by the executive orders issued thereunder."0 It will be convenient
to divide this treatment into two major sections, one dealing with
the nature of the Custodian's administrative powers, the other,
with the rights of property-holders affected by the exercise of
those powers.
I. THE NATURE OF THE CUSTODIAN'S POWER
The urgency of war and the political impotence of enemy aliens
conduced to a gorgeous and rather unusual liberality in the Con-
gressional grant of power to the Custodian. Section 5 (b), as ex-
panded by Title III of the First War Powers Act of 1941, pro-
vides that "any property or interest of any foreign country or
national thereof shall vest, when, as, and upon the terms, directed
by the President . . . ." 11 There were reasons for making Sec-
tion 5(b) broad. For one thing, it expanded and ratified the
freezing controls which were already in effect. For another, the
I For a description of these patents, see Standard Oil Co. v. Markham, 64 F.
Supp. 656 (S. D. N. Y. i945), affd, 163 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333
U. S. 873 (1948).
9 ANNxAL REPORT, supra note 7 at 3, 57, 69.
'9The Office of Alien Property Custodian was created and authority to exercise
powers under the Trading with the Enemy Act was conferred upon the Custodian
by Exec. Order No. 9095, 7 FED. REo. ig7i (1942) (issued March ii, 1942), later
amended by Exec. Order No. 9193, 7 FED. REG. 5205 (1942) (issued July 6, 1942),
and Exec. Order No. 9567, io FED. REG. 6917 (i945) (issued June 8, 1945). By
Exec. Order No. 9788, i FED. REG. Ixg8i (1946) (issued October 14, 1946), the
Attorney General succeeded to the powers and duties of the Alien Property Custo-
dian. In this article the term "Custodian" will be employed to describe both the
Alien Property Custodian and the Attorney General as his successor.
"1 Some idea of the sense of urgency which spurred the Congress on as it
amended § 5(b) may be gathered from the bare statement that on December i8,
1941, precisely one week after the original bills were introduced in the House and
Senate, it had shot through committees, been debated and passed, and been signed
by the President. 87 CONG. REc. 9704, 9706, 9753, 9789, 98oI, 9828, 9837-46,
9855-68, 9893-95, 9946-47 ('94r) ; - 5 STAT. 841 (194i), 50 U. S. C. Alp. § 621
(1946).
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TRADING WITH THE ENEMY ACT
legislative mind was in a state of great vagueness as to whether
the World War I Trading with the Enemy Act was alive, dead,
or half-dead 2 and many legislators undoubtedly regarded the
amended Section 5 (b) as a capsule Trading with the Enemy Act,
conferring anew any of the old powers which might have lapsed
and adding some new ones.
In practice the question of the extent of the survival of the
old Act has not proved embarrassing. It seems to have been as-
sumed from the first by both administrators and courts that the
World War I provisions (except such of them as in terms were
applicable only to that war) had not been dead but only sleeping,
and that they automatically became effective upon the outbreak
of World War -II. The President transferred to the new Custodian
the powers and functions exercised by his counterpart during the
first World War;' 3 the Custodian carefully avoided any implica-
tion in his vesting orders and other pronunciamentos that he was
limiting himself to Section 5 (b); the lower courts persistently
cited the sections of the old Act and cases construing it;' 4 and at
length the Supreme Court made it official by holding that the new
Section 5(b) and the holdover sections of the Act were "parts
of an integrated whole" and that the old sections were to be
treated as operative, so far as that could be done without defeat-
ing the purpose of the later enactment. Consequently, it is clear
that Section 7(c),16 as construed by the courts during and after
World War I, is still in force. While not so simple as Section
5(b), it is rather more explicit, for it expressly provides that the
Custodian's administrative determination shall be conclusive for
purposes of an initial transfer of possession: "Any money or other
property including (but not thereby limiting the generality of
""Title III of the bill deals with the Trading with the Enemy Act, which
originally became law on October 6, 1917, during the last war. Some sections of
that Act are still in effect. Some sections have terminated, and there is doubt as to
the effectiveness of other sections." H. R. REP. No. 1507, 77th Cong., ist Sess.
2-3 (1941).
"3 Exec. Order No. 9142, 3 CODE FED. REGs. 1148 (Cum. Supp. 1943).
4 E.g., The Pietro Campanella, 47 F. Supp. 374 (D. Md. 1942) ; Draeger Ship-
ping Co. v. Crowley, 49 F. Supp. 215 (S. D. N. Y. i943); The Aussa, 52 F. Supp.
927 (D. N. J. 1943); Stem v. Newton, ISo Misc. 241, 39 N. Y. S.2d 593 (Sup. Ct.
1943).
15 Markham v. Cabell, 326 U. S. 404, 411 (1945).
140 STAT. 416 (1917), as amended, 40 STAT. 1020 (izx8), 5o U. S. C. App.
§ 7(c) (1946).
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HARVARD LAW REVIEW
the above) . . . choses in action, and rights and claims of every
character and description owing or belonging to or held for, by,
on account of, or on behalf of, or for the benefit of, an enemy or
ally of enemy . . .which the President after investigation shall
determine is so owing or so belongs or is so held, shall be con-
veyed, transferred, assigned, delivered, or paid over to the Alien
Property Custodian, or the same may be seized by the Alien Prop-
erty Custodian . . "
A. The Power of Summary Seizure
The Supreme Court, when the World War I Custodian took
to the courts to enforce his summary demands for possession,17
showed no disposition to be niggardly in honoring this grant of
power, for it held in substance that the Custodian's suit to enforce
his demand was tantamount to taking with a strong hand " and
cnot to be defeated or delayed by defenses, its only condition
.. .being the determination by the Alien Property Custodian
that it was enemy property." 19 The lower courts gave equally
short shrift to attempts to resist or delay compliance with the
Custodian's demands.20
Permissible Defenses. - In the light of this legislative and judi-
cial language, it might at first blush be supposed that resistance
to the Custodian's summary demand for property which he deter-
mines to be owned by or owing to an enemy would be a waste
of time and counsel fees. In practice, however, some holders of
such property -especially banks and large commercial organ-
izations - seem to have a deep-rooted, probably instinctive,
- aversion to the handing over of large sums of money upon the
naked demand of a Government agency. In fact, the tenacity
of holders of vested property and the fertile imaginations of their
counsel have succeeded at least in casting doubt upon the Cus-
" Section 17 of the Act gives the federal district courts jurisdiction to enforce
the provisions of the Act. 40 STAT. 425 (1917), 50 U. S. C. App. § 17 (1946).
"s Mr. Justice Holmes in Central Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U. S. 554, 566,
568-69 (1921).
"o Mr. Justice McKenna in Commercial Trust Co. v. Miller, 262 U. S. 51, 56
(1923). See also Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U. S. 239 (1921).
"0E.g., American Exchange Nat. Bank v. Garvan, 273 Fed. 43 (2d Cir. 1921),
aff'd, 26o U. S. 7o6 (1922); Columbia Brewing Co. v. Miller, 281 Fed. 289 (5 th
Cir. 1922); Hicks v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., io F.2d 6o6 (D. Md. 1926), aff'd
sub norn. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Sutherland, 18 F.2d 56o (4 th Cir. 1927).
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TRADING WITH THE ENEMY ACT
todian's power of summary seizure in two rather common situa-
tions- where the holder disputes the Custodian's finding of the
existence of an indebtedness to an enemy, and where the holder
asserts a possessory lien on the enemy's property.
Both these questions were presented to the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit in Clark v. Manufacturers Trust Co.,2
recently decided. The Custodian had found the Trust Company
to be indebted to the Deutsche Reichsbank in the amount of
$25,ooo and had demanded that that sum be paid over. The Trust
Company refused to comply, asserting first, that it was not in-
debted in any amount, because its obligation to the German bank
was more than set off by a claim against that bank; and second,
that this obligation created a "banker's lien" on the Reichsbank's
deposit, by virtue of which the Trust Company was entitled to
retain possession of the money, under Section 8(a) of the Act.
22
The district court had, without opinion, ordered the Trust Com-
pany to pay over the sum demanded, with interest at 6 per cent
from the date of the demand.
The court of appeals, remarking that the appeal presented
"several interesting questions upon which there is surprisingly
little direct authority," itself created but little new authority on
the two principal questions. By holding that a setoff is "tech-
nically . . .a money demand independent of and unconnected
with the plaintiff's cause of action," 23 the Court felt able to fall
back on the well settled proposition that a debtor must pay to the
Custodian an undisputed debt.24 But, by way of dictum, the court
said that it would "hesitate" to hold that the Custodian's power
to seize money which he determines to be owing to an enemy
21 x69 F.2d 932 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U. S. 910 (1949).
2240 STAT. 418 (1917), 50 U. S. C. APP. § 8(a) (1946).
2 Clark v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 169 F.2d 932, 934, 935 (2d Cir. 1948),
cert. denied, 335 U. S. 910 (1949). The court distinguished New York cases which
had stated that where a bank asserts a setoff against a depositor's claim, "it is
only the balance which is the real or just sum owing . . . ." Long Beach Trust
Co. v. Warshaw, 264 N. Y. 331, 334, i9o N. E. 659, 66o (i934); Kress v. Central
Trust Co., 246 App. Div. 76, 79, 283 N. Y. Supp. 467, 471 (4th Dep't 1935),
aff'd, 272 N. Y. 629, 5 N. E.2d 365 (1936), on the ground that "this language is
appropriate to the cases where it was used but would seem to have little bearing
on the question now before us." Clark v. Manufacturers Trust Co., supra at 935.
"'American Exchange Nat. Bank v. Garvan, 273 Fed. 43 (2d Cir. X921), aff'd,
260 U. S. 7o6 (1922); Kohn v. Jacob & Josef Kohn, 264 Fed. 253 (S. D. N. Y.
1920).
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HARVARD LAW REVIEW
extends to a debt the validity or extent of which the debtor does
not acknowledge. 5 What seemed to stick in the judicial craw
were the "exceedingly drastic" consequences which such a power
might entail, and specifically the possibility that one who was in
fact not indebted might be compelled hastily to liquidate property
in order to satisfy the Custodian's demand and might thereby
suffer damage for which the Act provides no remedy. All this may
be conceded, but there are certain factors - aside from the rather
plain language of the statute "I -which may make the Custo-
dian's position morally as well as legally tenable. In the first
place, it must be assumed that the Custodian will, as he has in
the past, exercise reasonably the sweeping discretion which Con-
gress has given him. After all - as a judge of the second circuit
once pointed out -he could, if he were so minded, "capture
enemy property with a sergeant and file or otherwise vi et
armis," 27 although in practice the Custodian has never called on
the Military Police to reason with recalcitrants. Neither would
he be likely to compel a small debtor to sell his home in order to
comply with a summary demand under Section 5(b) or 7(c).
And indeed, in the Manufacturers Trust Co. case, it is reasonable
to assume that the Trust Company was in a position to raise
$25,000 without recourse to the auction block.
More important from the Custodian's standpoint is the con-
sideration that the creation- or even the adumbration- of a
2"See Clark v. Manufacturers Trust Co., I69 F.2d 932, 935 (2d Cir. 1948),
cert. denied, 335 U. S. 910 (1949). The United States District Court for Hawaii
has recently followed this dictum, holding that the Custodian could not summarily
collect the amount of a debt which he determined to be owing to an enemy, when
the respondent flatly denied the existence of any debt whatsoever. Clark v. Nii,
Civil No. 837, D. Hawaii, Nov. i9, 1948. This judicial reluctance finds support
in some World War I dicta by Judge Learned Hand. See Simon v. Miller, 298
Fed. 520, 523 (S. D. N. Y. 1923). However, judge Hand did not have to face
the problem squarely in the Simon case, for the Custodian had in fact gotten pos-
session of the disputed property and the suit was one which the claimant could
clearly maintain to recover it, under § 9(a) of the Act. See pp. 749-58 infra.
2 6 "Any money . . . owing . . . to . . . an enemy . . . which the President
after investigation shall determine is so owing . . . shall be . . . paid over to the
Alien Property Custodian, or the same may be seized by the Alien Property Cus-
todian . . . ." 40 STAT. 416 (z917), as amended, 40 STAT. 1020 (1918), 50 U. S. C.
APP. § 7(c) (1946).
27 Hough, J., concurring in American Exchange Nat. Bank. v. Garvan, 273 Fed.
43, 48 (2d Cir. 1921), aff'd, 26o U. S. 7o6 (1922). See also Garvan v. $20,000
Bonds, 265 Fed. 477, 478 (2d Cir. i92o), aff'd sub noin. Central Trust Co. v.
Garvan, 254 U. S. 554 (1921).
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TRADING WITH THE ENEMY ACT
ground on which to resist his demand for possession threatens to
"entangle this power in incidental litigations" and thereby hinder
the purpose of this part of the Act, which is to "accomplish a swift,
certain, and final reduction to possession of vast quantities of
property involved in incredible complication of ownership and
interest";2" for the grounds on which a debt may be disputed are
many and complex. It may be anticipated that counsel of ordi-
nary ingenuity will not be at a loss for grounds on which to deny
indebtednesses which the Custodian has found to exist.
Moreover, while the power is drastic, it is far from the most
drastic of the war powers exercised by Congress. A bank com-
plaining of the severity of the Trading with the Enemy Act would
probably receive little sympathy from an individual compelled
to "comply with the immensely more grievous demand for the
possible sacrifice of life and limb." 2 Perhaps for reasons such as
these, two federal courts which have squarely faced the problem
have taken the statutory language at face value and ordered the
protesting debtor to pay over.30
The second circuit, also in the Manufacturers Trust Co. case,
left equally unsettled the question presented by Section 8 of the
Act, which provides in substance that any nonenemy "holding a
lawful mortgage, pledge, or lien, or other right in the nature of
security in property of an enemy . . . may. continue to hold said
property . . ." The Custodian took the position that this sec-
tion was designed not to protect lienors from the temporary dis-
possession to which all property holders are subject, but to ensure
that an American holder of a possessory lien might, in a suit un-
der Section 9 (a) of the Act, recover not merely the value of his
2The quotations, like so many other lapidary phrases in current legal writing,
are borrowed from Judge Learned Hand. See Kahn v. Garvan, 263 Fed. 909,
916-17 (S. D. N. Y. 1920). Although written in another context, they are not easy
to reconcile with the reluctance to recognize this aspect of the Custodian's power
which that eminent jurist displayed in Simon v. Miller, 298 Fed. 520, 523 (S. D.
N. Y. 1923).
2
1Judge Learned Hand in Silesian-American Corp. v. Markham, z56 F.2d
793, 798 (2d Cir. 1946), aff'd sub norm. Silesian-American Corp. v. Clark, 332
U. S. 469 (1947).
'o Camp. v. Miller, 286 Fed. 525 (5th Cir. 1923) ; Clark v. E. J. Lavino & Co.,
72 F. Supp. 497 (E. D. Pa. X947); cf. Miller v. Rouse, 276 Fed. 715 (S. D. N. Y.
1921) (refusal to consider executor's contention that sum determined to be owed
to an enemy and demanded by Custodian was really an unexecuted gift rather
than a debt).
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HARVARD LAW REVIEW
equity in the property, but actual possession of the whole of the
property3 1 In avoiding the question of the right of a lienor to
resist the Custodian's summary demand for possession, the court
was clearly on firm ground, for a "banker's lien" is not in fact a
lien, but merely a right to setoff,32 and, a fortiori, could not be an
interest in property of an enemy, given the elementary proposi-
tion that funds deposited in a bank cease to be the property of
the depositor the moment they are deposited, so that the relation-
ship is that of creditor and debtor rather than that of bailor and
bailee. Nevertheless, it is to be regretted that the problem was
not squarely presented, for the question of the right of a holder
of enemy property to plead a possessory lien as a defense to a
suit by the Custodian to enforce a demand for possession is left
in almost total darkness. Almost total, but not quite: a dissenting
opinion in the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit contains
dicta to the effect that even holders of liens within the scope of
Section 8(a) must comply with the Custodian's demand for pos-
session, their remedy being a suit to regain possession under
Section 9(a);3 3 and the unqualified language of Mr. Justice
Holmes in Central Trust Co. v. Garvan " was employed in the
face of vigorous argument that the appellants were within the
class of lienors protected by Section 8 and hence entitled to raise
a defense against the Custodian's possessory action. Holmes
ignored dicta in the unreported opinion of Judge Augustus Hand
in the District Court which seemed to favor the proposition that
a lienor could resist the vesting order.
35
The question is one which is bound, sooner or later, to be pre-
sented in such form that decision is inescapable. The court to
31 See Clark v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 169 F.2d 932, 936 (2d Cir. 1948), cert.
denied, 335 U. S. 910 (1949). The right to liquidate the security may in itself
be important, for the lienor, being presumably more familiar with the business,
may be'in a better position than the Custodian to obtain the full value of the
hypothecated property. See Mayer v. Garvan, 278 Fed. 27, 35 (ist Cir. 1922). Of
course, upon liquidation of the security the lienor would be obliged to pay over
to the Custodian any surplus remaining after the satisfaction of his claim against
the enemy.
12 Furber v. Dane, 203 Mass. oS, xi7-18, 89 N. E. 227, 230 (1909). See Note,
38 HARv. L. REv. 8oo (1925).
" See Anderson, J., dissenting on other grounds in Mayer v. Garvan, 278 Fed.
27, 35 (ist Cir. 1922).
24 254 U. S. 554, 566, 568-69 (I92I) ; see p. 726 supra.
22 See Brief for Plaintiffs in Error, Marshall, Rosen and Metz, p. r38, Central
Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U. S. 554 (1921).
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TRADING WITH THE ENEMY ACT
which this happens may well find itself in something approaching
a quandary. On the one hand, it is a strain on the normal import
of the phrase "continue to hold" to say that it means to surrender,
and thereafter recover, possession; on the other, a Congressional
intent to confer on a mere lienor an immunity from temporary
dispossession, an immunity which is denied to an outright owner
of property, would be, to say the least, capricious. Lacking con-
trolling precedent, a court might well be required to delve into
the legislative history of the section. The provision seems to have
been added at the instigation of the New York Stock Transfer
Association, which feared that otherwise the Act might be open
to a construction permitting the permanent destruction of pos-
sessory rights of American security holders." Such a purpose im-
plies a recognition that the Act does require an initial surrender
of possession at the Custodian's demand.
Interest on Vested Funds. - The practical significance of these
questions depends in part upon the answer to another disputed
point: is the Custodian entitled to recover interest on a sum de-
manded by him, from the date of his demand, if the holder refuses
to comply until ordered to do so by a court? If the X Bank,
holding a $35o,ooo deposit in the name of Hans Schmidt of Berlin,
knows that there is no defense to the Custodian's demand and
knows also that the demand will bear interest at the rate of six per
cent 37 from the date of service, it may reasonably be supposed
that the Custodian's turnover directive will be obeyed with gratify-
ing promptitude. If, on the other hand, there are permissible de-
fenses, and if it costs nothing to try them, tle directors of X
Bank may be expected to postpone, by the most protracted litiga-
36 See Hearings before Senate Subcommitee on Commerce on H. R. 4960, 65th
Cong., rst Sess. 59, x6o (1917) ; H. R. REP. No. 85, 65th Cong., ist Sess. 3 (19,7) ;
SEN. REP. No. 113, 65th Cong., ist Sess. 8 (1917). The hypercaution of the stock-
brokers may have been founded on the somewhat loose generality that a possessory
lien does not survive surrender of possession. See RESTATEMENT, SECURIT §§ x,
So (1941); JoNES, PLEDGES & COLLATERAL SECURITIES §§ 23, 34, 40 (2d ed. igo).
11 Since the obligation to comply with the Custodian's demand is created by
federal law, the rate of interest provided by state law would not be controlling.
Board of Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U. S. 343 (1939); Royal Indemnity Co. v.
United States, 313 U. S. 289 (1941). It is, however, a handy yardstick of fairness
of which the federal courts may avail themselves. Ibid.; Massachusetts Bonding
& Ins. Co. v. United States, 97 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1938). In most states, the legal
rate of interest is in the neighborhood of 6%. E.g., N. Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 370;
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 3 (1930).
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HARVARD LAW REVIEW
tion possible, the loss of the revenue from the $350,000. A ma-
jority of the second circuit in the Manufacturers Trust case
(Judge Clark dissenting) reversed the district court and resolved
this question against the Custodian, principally on the grounds
that the Act does not provide for the payment of interest "or any
other penalty" in the event of noncompliance with the Custodian's
demand and that "the summary procedure provided by Section 17
enables the Custodian, without delay if he immediately invokes
it, to obtain an order directing compliance." 38
On the other hand, Congressional failure to provide for interest
in a statute creating an obligation has been held not to preclude
the courts from awarding interest on the obligation, pursuant
to "the historic judicial principle that one for whose financial ad-
vantage an obligation was assumed or imposed, and who has
suffered actual money damages by another's breach of that obliga-
tion, should be fairly compensated for the loss thereby sus-
tained." " The Supreme Court, where Congress is silent on the
interest question, in effect appraises the Congressional purpose
to see whether the main purpose of the statute creating the obliga-
tion was to enrich the obligee or penalize the obligor. The courts
will not impose interest on criminal fines,40 nor even on non-
criminal penalties such as those imposed under the Agricultural
Adjustment Act.4 1 They will allow interest where the obligation
to the United States has been created as a revenue measure
42
The obligation to turn over property demanded by the Alien
Property Custodian is obviously not in the nature of a fine or
penalty. The Act may, in fact, be analogized to a revenue meas-
ure if one recalls its purpose to compel the use of certain property
in the best interests of the United States, and recalls, further, that
the most recent Congressional amendment in substance provides
that the proceeds of vested German and Japanese property shall
be covered into the Treasury43 and that the former owners shall
recover neither their property nor compensation therefor. The
38169 F.2d 932, 936 (1948).
3 See Rodgers v. United States, '332 U. S. 371, 373 (1947) ; cf. United States v.
U. S. Fidelity Co., 236 U. S. 512 (1915); Billings v. United States, 232 U. S. 261
(1914); Royal Indemnity Co. v. United States, 313 U. S. 289 (1941).
"'Pierce v. United Sates, 255 U. S. 398, 405-o6 (1921).
41 Rodgers v. United States, 332 U. S. 371 (1947).
"2 Billings v. United States, 232 U. S. 261 (1914).
" 62 STAT. 1246 (1948), 5o U. S. C. A. App. § 2011 (Supp. 1949).
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TRADING WITH THE ENEMY ACT
morals of this confiscation will be discussed below; 44 it is sufficient
for the present discussion that seizures of enemy property under
the Trading with the Enemy Act do, under the existing legislative
policy, redound to the "financial advantage" of the United
States.
This reasoning is not affected by the fact that the Custodian's
determination may be wrong and the nonenemy possessor of the
property may be enabled to recover it in a suit under Section 9 (a)
of the Act. The same thing is true of tax procedure, where the
taxpayer is frequently required to pay first and litigate his rights
thereafter.45 In this procedure the government is given the right
to possess and use the money during the interim between the
administrative demand for it and the ultimate judicial review of
the administrative determination.4 6 Extension of the analogy from
tax procedure, however, might lead to the result that if the gov-
ernment were ultimately proved wrong, the holder of the seized
property would in his turn be entitled to interest from the time
of payment. While the point has never been decided- and ob-
viously cannot be until the courts dispose of the question whether
the Custodian is entitled to interest in the first place - it might
be held that a nonenemy who has paid over property to the Cus-
todian, with interest, and who has thereafter established his right
to the property, should recover not only the property itself but
also at least the interest which he paid.4 7
B. Vesting without Summary Seizure
So far, we have considered only the most summary type of
exercise of the Custodian's vesting power - a demand for specific
" See p. 744 infra.
4 Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U. S. 589, 595 (1931). Cf. Yakus v. United
States, 321 U. S. 414, 442-43 (1944).
a" See Salamandra Ins. Co. v. New York Life Ins. & Trust Co., 254 Fed. 852,
86o-6i (S. D. N. Y. i918), which analogizes the two procedures.
47 The Supreme Court has held that an American whose property was seized
under an erroneous determination that it was enemy property could recover not
only the proceeds of the sale of such property, but also whatever interest was
actually earned on the proceeds while they were in the possession of the Govern-
ment. Henkels v. Sutherland, 271 U. S. 298 (1926). If the property is considered
to have been in the constructive possession of the Government from the moment
of the Custodian's demand, Miller v. Kaliwerke Aschersleben Aktien-Gesellschaft,
283 Fed. 746, 752 (2d Cir. 1922) ; Application of Miller, 288 Fed. 76o, 767 (2d Cir.
1923), the interest awarded to the Custodian might well be regarded as "earnings"
within the rule of the Henkels case.
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HARVARD LAW REVIEW
property, which may take the form of a "res-vesting order," or a
"turnover directive," issued subsequent to an order vesting right,
title, and interest. When the Custodian issues such an order, it
means that he has determined that a particular thing is enemy
property; and for the purposes of immediate possession of that
thing his determination is conclusive, "whether right or wrong," 48
subject only to the qualifications indicated in the preceding para-
graphs. The practical effect of this is that the Custodian has the
use of the property during the interim between his administrative
determination of its enemy character and ultimate judicial review
of the correctness of that determination, every argument about
the existence or extent of enemy interest in the property being
deferred until suit is brought against the Custodian under Sec-
tion 9(a) of the Act.49
Where, however, there is no urgent need for an immediate
transfer of possession, the Custodian usually follows a course
calculated to minimize the dislocation of local judicial proceedings
and business, vesting in himself simply the "right, title and
interest" of the enemy in and to the property. Under such an
order, if there be any controversy concerning the nature or extent
of the enemy's interest in the property, the Custodian finds himself
in much the same position that the enemy himself would have
occupied -he is a litigant. As such, he participates in numbers
of lawsuits differing widely from those ordinarily engaged in by
the Federal Government, for they may and often do turn on ques-
tions of chemically pure state law. The Custodian, unsupported
by his hypothetical sergeant and file, has about the same rights
and duties as any other suitor.
To this last generalization, however, an important qualification
must be appended: the Custodian can, in theory at least, choose
his own time and - as between state and federal court - his own
forum. It has, in fact, been flatly stated that "neither the [dis-
trict] court nor any other tribunal in or of the United States
[has] jurisdiction to compel the Custodian to come into court
and . . . litigate or forego his demand . . . . He can use his
own method of procedure; courts cannot coerce him in limine." 50
" Central Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U. S. 554, 566 (1921).
4 9 E.g., Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U. S. 239 (1921). See pp. 749-58 infra.
5 Hough, J., concurring in American Exchange Nat. Bank v. Garvan, 273
Fed. 43, 48 (2d Cir. 1921).
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TRADING WITH THE ENEMY ACT
Since a suit against the Custodian is a suit against the United
States,5 any action against him must be brought within the terms
of Congressional consent. 2  Section 9(a) of the Act does not
authorize suit unless and until the Custodian has taken possession
of the property in which the nonenemy seeks to establish an inter-
est.53 Thus, where the Custodian has vested the right, title and
interest of an enemy in a piece of property, one who asserts an
interest adverse to the enemy's in that piece of property cannot
sue under Section 9(a).11 Consequently, he must wait for the
Custodian to initiate litigation.
The Custodian's possession of the initiative may not be com-
plete, however. Section I7 of the Act gives to federal district
courts plenary jurisdiction "to enforce the provisions of this Act,"
and in at least one case this grant has been held (by Judge
Learned Hand, reasoning on a "sauce-for-the-gander" basis) to
empower the court to entertain a trustee's suit to determine the
beneficial interests in the trust, where the Custodian had vested
the unascertained interest of some of the beneficiaries, but not
the trust res itself.55 Moreover, many proceedings in state courts
affecting property in which the Custodian has vested an interest,
notably probate proceedings, are in rem. Since a decree in such a
suit is binding upon all the world, including persons not within
reach of the court's process, the fact that the state court could
not compel the appearance of the Custodian 6 loses some of its
significance, for practical considerations will compel him to come
into court and make the most of the interest which he has vested.
5 7
51 Banco Mexicano v. Deutsche Bank, 263 U. S. 591 (1924); Cummings v.
Deutsche Bank, 3o0 U. S. ii5 (i937). See Cummings v. Societe Suisse pour
Valeurs de Metaux, 85 F.2d 287, 289 (D. C. Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 306 U. S. 631
(1939).
2 Stanley v. Schwalby, 162 U. S. 255, 269 (1896); United States v. Alabama,
313 U. S. 274, 282 (194).
" Sigg-Fehr v. White, 285 Fed. 949, 954 (D. C. Cir. 1923); cf. Hunter v. Central
Union Trust Co., i7 F.2d 174 (S. D. N. Y. 1926); Koehler v. Clark, 17o F.2d i79
(9th Cir. 1948).
54 Ibid.
" Kahn v. Garvan, 263 Fed. 9o9 (S. D. N. Y. 1920). It should be noted, how-
ever, that the trustee himself asserted no interest adverse to the Custodian, for he
paid the money into court and simply requested instructions as to its disposition.
"6 Cf. Propper v. Taylor, 27o App. Div. 89o, 62 N. Y. S.2d 6ox (1st Dep't
1946), reversing pro tanto 186 Misc. 72, 58 N. Y. S.2d 821 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
" See, e.g., Von Hennig v. Clark, I1 Misc. 261, 76 N. Y. S.2d 35o (Sup. Ct.
1948), aff'd IMer., 274 App. Div. 759, 80 N. Y. S.2d 727 (ist Dep't 1948). The
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HARVARD LAW REVIEW
The Supreme Court has finally placed beyond question the right
of the Custodian, at least at any time prior to an adjudication
in rem by a state tribunal, to resort to the federal courts to quiet
his title against other claimants.58 For example, in a recent pro-
ceeding under Section i7, a federal court determined that prop-
erty in administration in a state surrogate's court was impressed
with a constructive trust in favor of an enemy to whose interest
the Custodian had succeeded.59 Such an exercise of federal juris-
diction requires neither control over the property nor interference
with the local tribunal's possession thereof; yet the state court is
bound to recognize the right adjudicated by the federal court. 0°
Even in his role as private litigant, therefore, the Custodian may,
if he so desires, avail himself of certain legal advantages accorded
to the sovereign.
C. Interests Subject to the Vesting Power
Adequate consideration of the limits upon the types of enemy
interests which are capable of being vested-by the Custodian en-
tails an appraisal of the purposes of the Act. If an interest is not
within the scope of the Trading with the Enemy Act, a court in
which the Custodian seeks to assert it may not recognize his title;
or, if he vests by summary process the res to which the interest
attaches, he cannot retain it.
Custodian is authorized to seize property even if it is in the possession of a court.
Section 2(f), Exec. Order No. 9193, 7 FED. REG. 5205 (1942). Cf. In re Miller's
Estate, 193 P.2d 539 (948) (holding that the Custodian's vesting order divested a
state probate court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the vesting order).
But cf. Miller v. Clausen, 299 Fed. 723 (8th Cir. 1924), appeal dismissed, 269
U. S. 595 (1925). It must be borne in mind that the Custodian may be able to
foreclose litigation in the state court by the somewhat draconic method of admin-
istratively determining the extent of the enemy's interest in the property and
"res-vesting" that amount. If he thus gains possession of the bone of contention,
persons asserting interests adverse to the enemy's are relegated to suit in a federal
court, under § 9(a) of the Trading with the Enemy Act, to establish those
interests.
58 Markham v. Allen, 326 U. S. 490 (1946). Specifically, the decision affirmed
federal jurisdiction over a suit by the Custodian to determine the extent of the
rights which he had vested in a decedent's estate in administration before a state
court. Cf. Clark v. Propper, 169 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1948).
" Clark v. Tibbetts, 167 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1948).
'o Markham v. Allen, 326 U. S. 490, 494 (1946). Cf. Commonwealth Co. v.
Bradford, 297 U. S. 613 (1936) (affirming federal jurisdiction over suit by receiver
of national bank to establish interest in mortgage pool administered by state court
trustee).
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TRADING WITH THE ENEMY ACT
A recent New York decision, Matter of Herter,6' graphically
presents the problem. An enemy owned property in New York.
Before the Custodian got around to vesting it, the enemy died,
leaving a widow, also an enemy national, and a will. The will
left to the widow a sum much less than the share she would have
taken in the event of intestacy, and the bulk of the property to
certain nonenemy cousins of the testator. In these circumstances,
New York law gives to a widow a "personal" right to elect to
take her intestate share, in derogation of the will.62 The Custo-
dian promptly vested all the right, title and interest of the widow
in the New York estate of her husband, including specifically
her right of election.13 The surrogate held, in substance, that since
the right of election was "personal" to the widow, it could not
be vested or exercised by the Custodian, or by any person "acting
in hostility" to her, and that the action of the Custodian was in
consequence a nullity.
The decision presents certain difficulties. The Act, as we have
seen, gives to the Custodian the broadest imaginable powers with
respect to enemy property - it speaks of "any property or inter-
est" 64 and "choses in action, and rights and claims of every char-
acter and description." 65 Of course, some very pretty questions
might be posed as to what is "property." (Suppose, for example, a
German film company had contracted for the exclusive services of
a talented and glamorous actress, on very advantageous terms,
for a period of years: could the Custodian vest the enemy's right
to performance? So far, to the regret of his legal staff, that official
has encountered no such intriguing questions.) But no such ques-
tion can rationally be raised as to the nature of the right of election
62 193 Misc. 602, 83 N. Y. S.2d 36 (Surr. Ct. 1948), aff'd, 84 N. Y. S.2d 913
(App. Div. ist Dep't 1948).6 2 N. Y. DEc. EST. LAW § i8.
" Vesting Order No. 8407, 12 FED. REG. 1828 (1947), as amended, 12 FED. REG.
2966 (1947).
6455 STAT. 839 (94), 50 U. S. C. APP. § 5(b) (1946).
6540 STAT. 1020 (i9i8), 5o U. S. C. APP. § 7(c) (1946). It is clear that the
Custodian may vest and litigate an unliquidated claim for breach of contract.
E.g., Mutzenbecher v. Ballard, i6 F.2d 173 (S. D. N. Y. 1925), aff'd, i6 F.2d 174
(2d Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 273 U. S. 766 (1927) ; Nord Deutsche Ins. Co. v. J. L.
Dudley, Jr., Co., 169 N. Y. Supp. 303 (Sup. Ct. 1918) (not officially reported),
aff'd, 183 App. Div. 887, I69 N. Y. Supp. xio6 (1st Dep't i918); Rothbarth v.
Herzfeld, 179 App. Div. 865, i67 N. Y. Supp. i99 (ist Dep't 1917), aff'd, 223
N. Y. 578, II9 N. E. io75 (I918).
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HARVARD LAW REVIEW
conferred by the New York Decedent Estate Law. It is, in effect,
an option to acquire an intestate share of an estate and as such
would seem to be within'the scope of the Trading with the Enemy
Act.
It is well settled, at least, that restraints imposed by state law
on the alienability of more prosaic interests in property cannot
defeat the Custodian's power to vest 6 and, in particular, the New
York courts have sustained the Custodian's power to vest the
beneficial interest in a spendthrift trust, notwithstanding the facts
that under New York law the spendthrift himself could not have
alienated his interest, and his creditors could have reached only
the portion, if any, in excess of what was required to support him
in suitable style.17 The New York Court of Appeals has held that
an enemy's inchoate right of dower (for which the right of elec-
tion is a statutory substitute) could be divested by the Custo-
dian."' But there remains unsettled the question whether an in-
terest in property can be so "personal" that the Custodian can-
not be substituted for an enemy owner.
A closely allied question is the right of an individual testator
or settlor to condition a bequest or gift to an enemy upon the
enemy's capacity personally to take and enjoy the property. Thus,
a New York testatrix provided that if, in her executor's opinion,
"the transferring of this money to my beloved relatives," who
were residents and nationals of Germany, "shall be frustrated by
political conditions and laws which substantially deprive my be-
loved relatives of the full use and fruit of such bequests," the
executor should hold the funds in trust until such time as the be-
loved relatives could enjoy the full use and fruit of the bequests.
6 Great Northern Ry. v. Sutherland, 273 U. S. 182, 193-94 (1927); Miller v.
Kaliwerke Aschersleben Aktien-Gesellschaft, 283 Fed. 746, 751 (2d Cir. 1922).
67 Matter of Bendit, 214 App. Div. 446, 212 N. Y. Supp. 526 (ist Dep't 1925);
accord, Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Markham, 68 F. Supp. 829 (S. D.
N. Y. 1946). The court reasoned that the Custodian was not merely a transferee,
but was actually substituted for the enemy beneficiary in every respect concerning
the trust. Cf. Great Northern Ry. v. Sutherland, 273 U. S. 182, 193-94 (X927);
Keppelmann v. Palmer, 91 N. J. Eq. 67, io8 Atl. 432 (Ct. Err. & App. i919)
(state legislation in conflict with the Trading with the Enemy Act must give way
before the federal exercise of the war power).
6 Miller v. Lautenburg, 239 N. Y. 132, 145 N. E. 9o7 (1924). The common
law right of dower was "personal" to precisely the same extent as the statutory
substitute. Flynn v. McDermott, x83 N. Y. 62, 75 N. E. 931 (i9o5); Camardella
v. Schwartz, 126 App. Div. 334, iio N. Y. Supp. 6i (2d Dep't i9o8); see Matter
of Zalewski, 292 N. Y. 332, 337, 55 N. E.2d 184, z86 (i944).
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In such a situation as this the Custodian, when he has vested
the right, title and interest of the enemy legatee or beneficiary,
may make two arguments. In the first place he may contend that
a sort of statutory transubstantiation has taken place - that to
all legal intents he has become identified with the enemy, so that
payment to him satisfies the provisions of the will or trust instru-
ment.69 A less conceptual and more practical approach is em-
bodied in the contention that such provisions are simply at-
tempts to evade the Trading with the Enemy Act and hence are
void as against public policy.7" The Custodian must of course
contend further that if the condition is considered void, the bequest
operates as though the condition had been fulfilled, a rather ques-
tionable contention in those jurisdictions which treat gifts on void
conditions according to the presumed intent of the testator.
Rather surprisingly, considering how frequently some such de-
vice might have been expected to suggest itself to lawyers drawing
wills for testators with relatives in enemy (or potential enemy)
countries, research reveals but two reported cases, both in lower
courts.71 Each involved the sort of artless testamentary provision
quoted above, and in each case the court ordered immediate dis-
tribution to the Alien Property Custodian. The moral would seem
to be that testators, unless filled with natural love and affection
for the Alien Property Custodian, should not attempt to leave their
property, directly or indirectly, to persons who are, or are likely to
become, enemies within the meaning of the Trading with the
Enemy Act. Such devices may eventually be upheld by appellate
courts; but the question is at least doubtful, and - until such
time as it is definitely laid to rest -such provisions are pretty
likely to entail complex and costly litigation.72
69 Cf. Matter of Bendit, 214 App. Div. 446, 212 N. Y. Supp. 526 (ist Dep't 1925).
70 Cf. Commissioner v. Procter, 142 F.2d 824 (4th Cir. I944), cert. denied, 323
U. S. 756 (1944) (holding void as against public policy a condition subsequent
that a transfer should be deemed to be revoked if it were determined that the
federal gift tax was applicable) ; Matter of Rosenberg, 269 N. Y. 247, igg N. E.
206 (1935) (holding that, regardless of the state's policy on reaching the income
of a spendthrift trust, a federal tax lien could be imposed).
71 Matter of Reiner, 44 N. Y. S.2d 282 (Surr. Ct. 1943) ; Thee's Estate, 49 Pa.
D. & C. 362 (Orphans Ct. 1942). But cf. In re Thramm's Estate, 183 P.2d 97 (Cal.
App. 1947).
72 Much more difficult problems from the Custodian's standpoint are presented
by a testamentary provision that, if the alien is unable to take personally at the
time of distribution, the property shall be paid over to an alternate, nonenemy,
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D. "Revenue" Aspects of the Vesting Power
The Herter case suggests another interesting problem, and one
which colors strongly the judicial approach to construction and
enforcement of the Act. The lower court pointed out that the
effect of his holding was to place the property in the hands of
American citizens and said that if that were the consequence,
"no wrong to the United States is done." 7 But this reasoning
is not easy to reconcile with one of the basic purposes of the
Trading with the Enemy Act. Carried to its logical conclusion, it
would mean that, so long as the property is prevented from being
used by an enemy government in aid of its war effort against the
United States - whether by being awarded to the Custodian or
to some deserving American or left with the enemy subject to
certain restraints - the essential purpose of the Act is achieved.
A court with such a view of the statute cannot be expected to dis-
play much enthusiasm when asked to help the Custodian scoop
up the scattered assets of enemies, some of them widows and or-
phans, long after the defeat of Germany and Japan. The jaun-
diced judicial eye sees the Custodian as combining the least
attractive qualities of Shylock, Uriah Heep, and the unreformed
Ebenezer Scrooge, and tends to construe the Act narrowly against
this unamiable character.
This sort of judicial approach was taken by a majority of the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Josepkberg v. Mark-
ham.74 X, a naturalized American citizen of Italian birth, re-
turned to Italy in i93i for the sake of his mental health. He
never came back to the United States and, apparently, never fully
regained his sanity. In 1937 he inherited property of substantial
value located in New York, and in 1939 a New York court, deter-
mining him to be an incompetent, appointed Josephberg as his
committee. In 1943 the Alien Property Custodian, determining
X to be an enemy, vested his property. Josephberg brought suit,
under Section 9(a) of the Trading with the Enemy Act, to recover
beneficiary, rather than held indefinitely by the executor or trustee until such time
as the enemy's disability shall be removed. Although there seems to be no re-
ported case involving such a provision, several state probate courts have sanctioned
distribution to the alternate legatee in such cases.
13 193 Misc. 602, 6o5, 83 N. Y. S.2d 36, 40 (Surr. Ct. 1948), aff'd, 84 N. Y. S.2d
913 (App. Div. ist Dep't 1948) ; Stoehr v. Miller, 296 Fed. 414, 425 (2d Cir. 1923).
74 152 F.2d 644 (1945).
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TRADING WITH THE ENEMY ACT
the property. Strictly, the sole question before the Court was the
correctness of the Custodian's determination that X was an
enemy. Since, under the statute and the executive orders, enemy
character normally depends upon residence at the time of vest-
ing,75 the ultimate question was whether X was a resident of Italy.
The majority held that he was not, and backed up its conclusion
with the following considerations: 76
In determining whether [X] falls within the provisions of the stat-
ute . . . , his physical presence . . . is not decisive. . . . [X's] prop-
erty in New York was in no way threatened with subjection to enemy
uses by reason of his presence in Italy. He had no control over it him-
self since it was being administered by a committee appointed by the
New York court; and, consequently, Italy could exercise no control
over it through the control of him. Furthermore, the New York court
would not have permitted its use for the benefit of an enemy. . . . Such
use could also have been prevented by a freezing order issued by the
Treasury. ....
The property being in cash and securities its confiscation was not
required, as, for instance, is the case of assets consisting of, or controlling,
manufacturing facilities usable to secure production of materials to aid
this government in the prosecution of the war; and, as a means for the
purchase of such materials, it was comparatively negligible.
The purpose of confiscation under the Trading with the Enemy Act
is either to lessen the ability of the enemy government to make war
upon the United States by depriving it of the means so to do which
would otherwise be within its reach or to enhance the ability of this
country to prosecute the war ...
When this significance is, as it should be, given to term "resi-
dent" in the Trading with the Enemy Act . . . and in the Executive
Orders promulgated thereunder, it does not include a citizen in [X's]
situation.
Judge Clark dissented, saying that "the whole purpose of the
legislation may be frustrated if courts attempt to decide the valid-
ity of seizure upon the equities of individual cases." 77
The majority opinion amounts to a holding that an owner of
property is a "resident" of an enemy country only if there is a
possibility that the enemy government can exercise control of the
7540 STAT. 411 (1917), 50 U. S. C. ApP. § 2(a) (1946); Exec. Order No. 8389,
6 FED. REG. 2897 (1941); Exec. Order No. 9193, § io(a), 7 FED. REG. 5205 (1942).
76 152 F.2d 644, 648 (1945).
77Id. at 65o.
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HARVARD LAW REVIEW
property through him, or if the United States (in the opinion of
the court) really needs the property for its war effort. The upshot
is that the enemy's beneficial interest in the property is left un-
disturbed. The result may be defended upon the ground, sketchily
indicated by the court, that X's insanity deprived his physical
presence of the element of intent requisite to "residence" - al-
though it is, as Judge Clark suggested, doubtful whether there
is any such requirement, if the physical presence be not positively
against the will of the individual."8 At least one district court, in
another circuit, has "preferred" to treat the cited language as
dictum.79 Whatever the possibility of distinguishing the case out
of existence, it is evident that the quoted considerations were
fundamental to the court's decision.
If the court's basic premise were correct - that the Act has
no other purposes than to deprive enemy governments of the
sinews of war and to enhance the war-making ability of the
United States by making those sinews available to it- its deci-
sion would be more defensible, although still open to the charge
that the court substituted its discretion for that of Congress and
that of the President in deciding what property is needed by the
United States for its war effort. (The argument that X's prop-
erty, as a means for purchasing war material, was "comparatively
negligible" has not much force in any case - on such reasoning
many a citizen would be justified in refusing to pay his income
tax.) But if the Act had no other purposes than these, the vesting
provisions of the Trading with the Enemy Act would now be quite
obsolete, for the freezing program - as the court pointed out -
adequately achieved the first purpose, and the war against Ger-
many and Japan has been won.
In fact, as has been indicated, the purposes of the Act are now
much broader. Simply stated, one purpose is to help the United
7 8 An American prisoner of war (to select an extreme example adduced by the
majority opinion) would evidently not be a "resident" for purposes of vesting
under the Act. Cf. Stadtmuller v. Miller, Ii F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1926); Vandyke
v. Adams, [19421 All Eng. 139 (Ch.). The Custodian has, of course, never
attempted to vest the property of such persons. On the other hand, a British
court has held under the similar British Trading with the Enemy Act of
1939 that a British subject, temporarily visiting Jersey and trapped there by the
German occupation, was a resident in enemy territory within the meaning of the
Act. However, the question was presented only collaterally. In re Hatch (de-
ceased), [1948] 2 All Eng. 288 (Ch.).
" See Blank v. Clark, 79 F. Supp. 373, 377 (E. D. Pa. 1948).
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TRADING WITH THE ENEMY ACT
States defray some of the expenses which, although caused by
the war, did not really begin to accrue until actual hostilities had
ended. Moreover, in signing the Final Act of the Paris Confer-
ence on Reparations from Germany, 0 the United States agreed
in substance that German enemy property within its jurisdiction
should constitute a charge against reparations which might other-
wise be claimed from Germany.
There may properly be included among these expenses the cost
of putting the conquered populations back on their feet, through
Marshall Plan aid and otherwise, and the satisfaction of war
claims of American citizens against the Axis powers. In fact, the
vested German and Japanese property which the most recent
amendment to the Trading with the Enemy Act directs to be turned
over to the Treasury (instead of being returned to its former own-
ers), is to be used to create "a trust fund to be known as the War
Claims Fund," from which some (although not all) types of war
claims are authorized to be paid.8" The act, known as the War
Claims Act of 1948, of which this amendment is a part creates
a War Claims Commission with authority to receive and adjudi-
cate various classes of claims and to make recommendations to
Congress as to the payment of war claims not provided for by
the War Claims Act itself.8 2 Any surplus would presumably be
available for the general purposes of the United States, including
the defrayment of occupation costs and Marshall Plan aid.
This is a logical implementation of the general legislative intent
to use vested property "in the interest of and for the benefit of the
United States." 83 There is no doubt that the seizure and use of
enemy property in the United states is sanctioned not only by the
Constitution of the United States,8 4 but by international law.85
"0 U. S. TRATY SER., No. z655 (Dep't State 1946).
" 62 STAT. 1247 (1948), 50 U. S. C. A. Aep. § 2012 (Supp. 1949).
2 It should be noted that the decision in the Josephberg case antedated this
unequivocal expression of Congressional intent.
8 H. R. REP. No. 1507, 77th Cong., ist Sess. 2-3 (1941); 55 STAT. 839 (1941),
5o U. S. C. App. § 5(b) (z) (1946).
84Miller v. United States, ii Wall. 268, 305 (U. S. 1870). See McNulty,
Constitutionality of Alien Property Controls, ii LAw & CONTENT. PROB. 135
(1945). The author suggests that, even without Congressional sanction, the war
powers of the president might include the power to seize enemy property. Id. at
137.
85 See Rubin, "Inviolability" of Enemy Private Property, ii LAW & CONTENT.
PROB. 166 (1945). But cf. Sommerich, A Brief against Confiscation, id. at 152
et seq.
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HARVARD LAW REVIEW
Not less important, it seems justified according to the canons of
international morality, despite the lawyer's instinctive reaction
against confiscating the property of private persons who may not
fairly be chargeable with the misconduct of their governments.
Perhaps the most persuasive argument advanced is that which
starts from the premise that the war has compelled allied nations,
notably France and Great Britain, to seize and liquidate the dollar
assets of their nationals in the United States in order partially to
cover essential purchases. It would be an anomaly if German
and Japanese private citizens should emerge from the war with
their dollar assets intact."6 Of course, friendly nationals have
been compensated - after a fashion - by their own govern-
ments, in that they have received soft local currency, often at
an arbitrary and inadequate rate of exchange, for their hard dol-
lars; but there is no reason why the German and Japanese gov-
ernments should not do as much after the peace treaties have been
signed; and, indeed, the treaties might so provide.
Giving due weight to all these considerations, the courts might
well regard the Trading with the Enemy Act, in its present phase,
as a revenue measure, and enforce it accordingly. Preoccupation
with the purely defensive aspects of the Act is likely to make
many current cases seem hard; and every lawyer knows the tradi-
tional effect of hard cases.
II. THE RIGHTS OF THE PROPERTY HOLDER
A. Exculpatory Provisions of the Act
A natural and necessary complement to the summary powers
conferred on the Custodian is a provision exculpating persons
who obey or act in reliance upon his orders. Section 7 (e), enacted
during World War I, provides that "No person shall be held liable
in any court for or in respect of anything done or omitted in
pursuance of any order, rule, or regulation made by the President
under the authority of this Act." 8" This seems both broad and
plain, and the courts repeatedly implemented it fully."8 This
86 See Rubin, supra note 85, at 178.
8740 STAT. 46 ('917), 50 U. S. C. App. § 7(e) (1946).
"sE.g., Commercial Trust Co. v. Miller, 262 U. S. 5I (1923); Great Northern
Ry. v. Sutherland, 273 U. S. 182 (1927); Columbia Brewing Co. v. Miller, 281
Fed. 289 (5th Cir. 1922); Miller v. Kaliwerke Aschersleben Aktien-Gesellschaft,
283 Fed. 746 (2d Cir. 1922).
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provision was substantially re-enacted in the World War II
amendment of Section 5(b) 89 with the addition of the words "in
good faith" after "done or omitted." 90 While, in general, the
courts have not discriminated between the World War II provi-
sion and Section 7(e), 9" the words "in good faith," undoubtedly
somewhat ambiguous in the context, have led one federal court of
appeals to hold that the failure of the Japanese officials of a Japa-
nese bank in Hawaii to apply for the reissuance of their license to
operate - which had been revoked immediately after Pearl Har-
bor- showed such a lack of good faith as to render the bank
liable to its depositors for losses incurred through the bank's sus-
pension of operations.92 The net effect of the decision was to
reduce to the vanishing point the bank's surplus, which would
otherwise have gone to American minority stockholders and to
the Custodian. A mild comment upon this holding, on the facts,
is that it is unrealistic. It contains the mischievous implication
that it is the bounden duty of every person affected by a regula-
tion or order under the Trading with the Enemy Act to seek to
evade or resist it by every lawful means, administrative or judi-
cial, no matter how dim his prospects of success. Such a result
would do considerable violence to the fundamental scheme of the
Act, which is to facilitate the swift and summary conduct of eco-
nomic warfare.
89 Any re-enactment would seem to have been rather unnecessary, in the light
of Markham v. Cabell, 326 U. S. 404 (945).
90 Section 5(b)(2) provides that "no person shall be held liable in any court
for or in respect to anything done or omitted in good faith in connection with the
administration of, or in pursuance of and reliance on, this subdivision, or any rule,
regulation, instruction, or direction issued hereunder." 55 STAT. 839 (1941), 50
U. S. C. App. § 5(b)(2) (1946). Both this subsection and § 7(e) also provide in
substance that payment in compliance with the Act or an order of the Custodian
shall operate as a full acquittance of the obligation of the payor.
91 See, e.g., Silesian-American Corp. v. Clark, 332 U. S. 469 (1947) (§§ 5(b)
(2) and 7(e) protected a corporation from liability to existing holders of its
stock certificates arising out of compliance with the Custodian's demand for the
issuance to him of new certificates); Alexewicz v. General Aniline & Film Corp.,
1Si Misc. 1i8, 43 N. Y. S.2d 713 (Sup. Ct. 1943) (the section exonerated an em-
ployer who discharged an employee pursuant to an order issued under the Act).
92 Fujikawa v. Sunrise Soda Works Co., I58 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. I946), cert.
denied, 33I U. S. 832 (1946); cf. Dezsofi v. Jacoby, z78 Misc. 851, 36 N. Y. S.2d
672 (Sup. Ct. X942).
1949]
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B. Representation in Actions to Which the Custodian Is a Party
A knottier problem- or, at any rate, one as to which there
is some lack of judicial harmony -is the right of the Custodian
to be the 'exclusive representative in litigation of interests which
he has vested, or, as judicial latinists like to put it, dominus litis.
The divested property holder may well desire to be personally
represented in the litigation, in the hope that the property will
eventually be returned to him. It is inevitable that enemies whose
interests have been vested will remember the generous attitude
of Congress after World War I," despite the cold, unsympathetic
attitude of the post-World War II Congress.94 A person nursing
such hopes with respect to interests which have been vested may
fear lest the Custodian's defense of them in litigation be insuffi-
ciently solicitous - especially where the United States, in some
other capacity, has interests adverse to those vested." It is also
conceivable that a divested enemy, not so sanguine about the
chances of Congressional return, might prefer to have the prop-
erty awarded to an American relative or business associate with
a claim adverse to his own, rather than to the Government. Such
a person might regard vigorous litigation of the interest by the
Custodian as nothing short of officious- might, in brief, desire
13 In 1923 Congress authorized the return to enemies of a maximum of $io,ooo
of their seized property. 42 STAT. 1511 (1923). The Settlement of War Claims Act
of 1928 authorized the return of 8o% of such property, and would have per-
mitted the return of it all, had not Germany welshed on her own obligations to
Americans. 45 STAT. 254, 50 U. S. C. APP. § 9, et seq. (1946). The Joint Resolution
of June 27, 2934, suspended returns of German property vested during World
War I. 48 STAT. 2267 (1934).
" The latest amendment to the Act declares that "No property or interest
therein of Germany, Japan, or any national of either such country vested in or
transferred to any officer or agent of the Government at any time after Decem-
ber 17, 2942, pursuant to the provisions of this Act, shall be returned to former
owners thereof or their successors in interest, and the United States shall not pay
compensation for any such property or interest therein." 62 STAT. 1246 (1948),
5o U. S. C. A. App. § 2012 (Supp. 1949).
"5 E.g., Hamburg-American Line v. United States, 71 F. Supp. 324 (D.
Puerto Rico, 1947), aff'd, 168 F.2d 47 (ist Cir. 2948). Prior to the outbreak of
war, the United States filed in admiralty a libel for salvage against a German
ship, in which proceeding the German owners appeared as claimants. Thereafter
the Custodian vested the right, title, and interest of the owners in and to the vessel.
The district court, in a curious and somewhat inconsistent order, substituted the
Custodian as a party in all respects in place of the German owner, but nonetheless
permitted counsel for the enemy to appear and defend against the libel.
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TRADING WITH THE ENEMY ACT
an opportunity to present his former interest in its worst light.
From another viewpoint, restrictions on easy intervention may
be desirable. Thus, it may occur to a suspicious mind that Amer-
ican counsel for enemy former owners are not averse to appear-
ing in proceedings in rem and performing services compensable
out of the res, on the comfortable reasoning that no one save the
Government will be the poorer thereby.
Despite these considerations, or perhaps because of them, the
Custodian has been intolerant of the presence in court of repre-
sentatives of enemies whose interests have been vested. Prior to
vesting, while the Custodian is entitled to represent an enemy in
judicial or administrative proceedings concerning the enemy's
property interests, 6 and while his discretion in such a case is
absolute,97 he cannot properly object to an appearance by an au-
thorized representative of the enemy owner.9 Where, however,
the Custodian has vested the enemy's interest, the appearance of
the enemy in court seems at least anomalous.
This is so not because the enemy is an enemy,99 but simply be-
cause he po longer owns any interest in the property which is the
subject of the suit, any more than if he had sold or assigned his
interest. 100 It is a familiar and self-evident principle that one
who has no interest in property cannot ordinarily participate in
litigation concerning it,'' and there seems to be no special reason
for according to enemies any more favorable treatment than to
anyone else. The only federal appellate court which has squarely
considered this problem held that the mere hope nourished by a
9
8 Exec. Order No. 9193, § 5, 7 FED. REG. 5205 (1942).
9 See Petschek v. American Enka Corp., .82 Misc. 503, 504, 49 N. Y. S.2d 49
(Sup. Ct. 1944); Farmers & Merchants Nat. Bank v. Superior Court, 15o P.2d
241, 250 (Cal. App. i944), aff'd, 25 Cal.2d 823 (i945) ; Estate of Ferraro, Orphans
Ct., Allegheny County, Pa., No. 6165 (1941).
08 Cf. Matter of Renard, 179 Misc. 885, 39 N. Y. S.2d 968 (Surr. Ct. 1943).
91 The Trading with the Enemy Act expressly provides that an enemy may
defend by counsel any action brought against him, although he may not prosecute
one. 40 STAT. 416 (1917), 5o U. S. C. App. § 7(b) (1946). Cf. McVeigh v. United
States, xi Wall. 259 (U. S. 1870); Watts, Watts & Co. v. Unione Austriaca de
Navigazione, 248 U. S. 9, 22 (i918).
10 0 See Commercial Trust Co. v. Miller, 262 U. S. 51, g6 (1923) ; Cummings v.
Deutsche Bank, 300 U. S. 1I5, 121 (i937).
'0' Cf., e.g., United States v. 422 Casks of Wine, i Pet. 547, 549 (U. S. 1828);
White v. Hardy, 18o Misc. 63, 39 N. Y. S.2d gII (Sup. Ct. 1943), aff'd .nem., 266
App. Div. 660, 41 N. Y. S.2d 210 (ist Dep't 1943).
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HARVARD LAW REVIEW
divested enemy is not a sufficient interest to give him standing in
court."0 2 On the other hand, two district courts in other circuits,
drawing from the true premise that an enemy may defend a suit
against himself or his property 0 3 the fallacious conclusion that
he may defend an interest in property which he no longer owns,
have permitted enemy former owners to participate in proceedings
after the Alien Property Custodian had vested their interests and
intervened. 0 4 Similarly, the New York appellate division has
sanctioned the appointment of a guardian ad litem for infant ben-
eficiaries (in a trustee's suit for an accounting), despite the fact
that the infants' interest in the trust res had been vested and was
being actively represented by the Custodian.105 On the whole, it
is probable that the last word on this question has not yet been
spoken. In one situation at least, the former owner of the prop-
erty would seem in fairness entitled to a hearing - where he
either has commenced or is about to commence proceedings under
the Act to recover the interest vested by the Custodian. It might
not normally be practicable to postpone the proceedings concern-
ing the extent of the interest to await the outcome of the litigation
concerning its ownership; but in such a case it is suggested that
the claimant should be allowed to appear as amicus curiae.
102The Antoinetta, 49 F. Supp. 148, 1so-s (E. D. Pa. '943), aff'd, 153 F.2d
138, 143 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 328 U. S. 863 (1946).
103 See note 99 supra.
"04 The Pietro Campanella, 47 F. Supp. 374 (D. Md. 1942); United States v.
The San Leonardo, 51 F. Supp. 1o7 (E. D. N.. Y. 1942).
"05 Matter of von der Decken, 274 App. Div. 764, 8o N. Y. S.2d io9 (ist Dep't
1948). Neither the supreme court nor the appellate division wrote an opinion, and
the ground of the decision is consequently obscure. No motion had been made to
drop the infants as parties, and the appellate court may have believed that, since
they were named as parties, the Civil Practice Act made mandatory the appoint-
ment of a guardian. N. Y. Civ. PRac. AcT § 1313. A recent opinion of the New
York Supreme Court indicates that in some cases a guardian ad litem may be
regarded as necessary for the protection of unborn members (whose interests the
Custodian has not vested) of the class of which the enemies are the representatives
in esse. In re Bank of New York, 85 N. Y. S.2d 413, 414 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
Where the interests of the enemies are vested (in the ordinary legal sense of
the term) and presently payable, the same court has held that vesting by the Cus-
todian deprives the enemies of any interest in the property so that they cease to be
necessary or proper parties and may be excluded. Matter of Title Guarantee &
Trust Co. (Winnegge), N. Y. L. J., Dec. 15, 1948, p. i54o; cf. Matter of Winburn,
N. Y. L. J., Feb. 5, 1948, p. 468.
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TRADING WITH THE ENEMY ACT
C. Actions to Recover Vested Property: Judicial Review
of the Administrative Seizure
Unlike the proceedings which have so far been discussed, pro-
ceedings to recover or establish an interest in property which the
Custodian has vested properly call into question the correctness
of his administrative determination. Such a proceeding can be
brought only under Section 9 of the Act. Congress was explicit on
this point,'0 G and the courts have consistently refused to enter-
tain suits which could not be fitted within the framework of that
section.0 7 In effect, the plaintiff in such a suit must establish that
property seized by the Custodian (whether an interest or a res),
and which the plaintiff claims, is not enemy property. For exam-
ple, the Custodian, determining that Blackacre is the property
of Hans Fritz and that Hans is an enemy, vests Blackacre. Hans
Fritz may allege that in fact he was a loyal resident of the United
States and bring suit to recover his property. Or John Smith,
concededly a resident of the United States, may bring suit alleg-
ing that Hans Fritz conveyed Blackacre to him in 1939, or, per-
haps, that he has a mortgage on Blackacre to secure a past due
loan to Hans Fritz. Under a recent decision of the Supreme
Court, Clark v. Uebersee Finanz-Korporation,0 s in fact, any per-
son who comes within the requirement of Section 9 (a) that he be
"not an enemy or ally of enemy," 109 say a Swiss corporation, may
bring such a suit.
This last proposition, apparently so clearly required by the
language of Section 9 (a), was decided by the Supreme Court, not
without some difficulty. The trouble was caused by the apparent
conflict between the quoted language of Section 9 (a) and the au-
thority, conferred by the First War Powers Act of 1941,:" ° to vest
"any property or interest of any foreign country or national
"0I Section 7(c) of the Act provides in substance that the "sole relief and remedy
of any person having any claim" to any property seized by the Custodian shall
be that provided by the Act. Section 9 of the Act is the only one which authorizes
suit against the Custodian to recover or establish an interest in vested property.
o'0 E.g., Banco Mexicano v. Deutsche Bank, 263 U. S. 59, (1924) ; Sigg-Fehr v.
White, 285 Fed. 949 (D. C. Cir. 1923); Crone v. Sutherland, 63 F.2d 895 (D. C.
Cir. 1933); Von Hennig v. Clark, 19r Misc. 261, 76 N. Y. S.2d 350 (Sup. Ct.
1947), aff'd, 274 App. Div. 759, 80 N. Y. S.2d 727 (ist Dep't 1948).
108 332 U. S. 480 (1947).
10940 STAT. 419 (1917), 50 U. S. C. App. § 9(a) (1946).
11°55 STAT. 839 (194i), 50 U. S. C. Arp. § 5(b) (946).
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HARVARD LAW REVIEW
thereof," including friendly and neutral foreign countries. There
seemed to be little substance to such authority if a friendly or
neutral owner could recover his property as soon as vested, and
the Government in effect argued that the later enactment must be
construed to have amended Section 9 (a) to require that plaintiffs
show that they are not foreigners.
The Court avoided the difficulty by substantially rewriting Sec-
tion 2 of the statute. Since Section 2 defines the term enemy as
used in Section 9(a), a broadening of this definition enabled the
Court to reach the desired result without ignoring the fact that
Section 9(a) was limited to an "enemy or ally of enemy." Sec-
tion 2 defined "enemy" in substance as any individual (regardless
of nationality) resident (or corporation incorporated) in enemy
territory; or resident (or incorporated) outside the United States
and doing business within enemy territory. Under this section,
the Court had previously held that the ownership and control of
a corporation were irrelevant: so long as it was neither incor-
porated nor doing business within enemy territory, it was not an
"enemy or ally of enemy." "' Such "rigidity and inflexibility" 112
was, of course, a standing invitation to adroit German and Japa-
nese financial experts, particularly the Germans, who were con-
veniently near Switzerland and Sweden. The concealment of
German interests in the United States was frequently attempted
through the medium of neutral or American corporations, whose
German affiliations were more or less camouflaged." 3 The Court
recognized that Section 5(b), as amended, was intended to plug
this breach in the nation's economic defenses. But it could hardly
have that effect unless the phrase "enemy or ally of enemy" were
either given a meaning broad enough to prevent recovery of prop-
erty by Axis associates in neutral territory or were read out of
Section 9(a) altogether. Thus, in effect the Court had either to
rewrite Section 2 or Section 9(a).
Recognizing that "the problem is not without its difficulties
... Behn, Meyer & Co. v. Miller, 266 U. S. 457 (1925); Hamburg-American
Line v. United States, 277 U. S. 138 (1928).
2 See Clark v. Uebersee Finanz-Korporation, 332 U. S. 480, 484 (1947).
1.3 See ADmINISTRATION o WARTIE FINANcIAL AND PROPERTY CONTROLS OF
THE UNITED STATES GOVERNME'NT 29-31 (U. S. Treas. Dep't 1942); Hearings be-
fore a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs Pursuant to
S. Res. 107 and S. Res. 146, 79th Cong., rst Sess. 49, 52, 68-69, 564-85, 969-77, 1o63,
1203-21 (i945); H. R. REP. No. 2398, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1946).
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TRADING WITH THE ENEMY ACT
whichever way we turn," 4 a unanimous Court decided that re-
vision of Section 2 to harmonize with Section 5(b), as amended
by the Act of i94i, was the less drastic operation. Accordingly,
it held the definitons contained in that section to be "merely illus-
trative, not exclusionary"; 15 an "enemy taint" would be enough
to make a neutral, friendly or American corporation an "enemy
or ally of enemy" for the purposes of the Trading with the Enemy
Act. Prudently, if tantalizingly, the Court refrained from defin-
ing "enemy taint," for the procedural posture of the Uebersee
case was such that the plaintiff was assumed to be free of any
enemy interest whatsoever.'"
It may at least be supposed that enemy control would consti-
tute an "enemy taint." The federal courts have in other contexts
given some provocative definitions of "control," which will prob-
ably not be lost upon the Custodian. Thus, it has been remarked
that "under some circumstances controlling influence may spring
as readily from advice constantly sought as from command arbi-
trarily imposed"; 17 and under the Public Utility Holding Com-
pany Act "control" and "controlling influence" have been held
to "include the power to control and the power to exert a con-
trolling influence as well as the actual exercise of such power." 118
And the Supreme Court has emphasized that questions of control
turn upon "actualities" rather than upon any "artificial test"
114 Clark v. Uebersee Finanz-Korporation, 332 U. S. 480, 488 (1947).
115 Id. at 488-89.
116 On remand to the district court, however, it was held that various factors,
including a "usufructuary" interest in the property by German nationals and a cer-
tain fishiness in the claimed neutral (Liechtensteinean) status of the owner of the
remaining interest, constituted a sufficient "enemy taint." Uebersee Finanz-Korpo-
ration v. Clark, i7 U. S. L. WEEK 2394 (D. D. C. Feb. 21, 1949). A curious con-
trast to the Uebersee case is furnished by the Court's opinion, handed down
the same day in Silesian-American Corp. v. Clark, 332 U. S. 469 (i947). Al-
though not actually inconsistent with the Uebersee case, for it holds only
that the Custodian may summarily reduce to possession neutral or friendly alien
property, it speaks of the nonenemy alien's right to "just compensation" for the
taking of his property. Id. at pp. 479-8o. But such a right would seem not
to exist, or at least to he redundant, if he may recover the property itself in a suit
under Section 9(a) of the Trading with the Enemy Act, for in that case there
would be no "taking."
""ISee American Gas & Elec. Co. v. SEC, 134 F.2d 633, 642 (D. C. Cir. 1943),
cert. denied, 319 U. S. 763 ('943).
118 Public Serv. Corp. v. SEC, 129 F.2d 899, 903 (3d Cir. 1942) ; Detroit Edison
Co. v. SEC, iig F.2d 730, 739 (6th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U. S. 618 (1941).
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HARVARD LAW REVIEW
and are issues "of fact to be determined by the special circum-
stances of each case." 119
At any rate, the Uebersee decision insures that the property of
genuinely friendly or neutral aliens will not be confiscated. The
Court's reluctance to find such a Congressional intent seems justi-
fied in the light of recent amendments to' the Act which authorize
(although they do not compel) the return of vested property to
"technical enemies" such as nationals and residents of allied or
neutral countries whose "enemy" status was involuntarily ac-
quired via German or Japanese occupation; 20 victims of Nazi
racial, religious, and political persecution who were similarly en-
emies in name only; and Italians, who are considered to have
restored themselves to the friendship of the United States. 2 '
A new twist to the problem of eligibility for return has been
given by the most recent amendment of the Act.' That section
expressly forbids return of any vested property to any "national"
(i.e., citizen) of Germany or Japan. But, it will be recalled, the
test of enemy status under Sections 2 and 9(a) of the Act has
normally been residence rather than citizenship. Thus, a case
recently decided by the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York presented facts virtually identical
with those of Josephberg v. Markham 123 except that the incom-
petent whose property had been vested was admittedly a citizen
of Germany. There was no doubt that the Custodian had been
authorized to vest the property, for Section 5(b) authorizes the
vesting of the property of any "foreign national;" the question,
119 Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 309 U. S. 125, 145 (1939).
120 "Enemy" status is fixed as of the time of vesting, and would not be affected
by any subsequent change of nationality, residence, or international relations. Swiss
Ins. Co. v. Miller, 267 U. S. 42, 44 (1925). In that case, the Custodian had
vested the property of a Swiss corporation, after finding that it was doing business
in Germany and was consequently an "enemy." The corporation attempted to re-
cover its property under § 9(a), arguing that it was no longer an enemy because,
in the first place, it had ceased to do business in Germany and, in the second place,
a treaty of peace had been concluded between the United States and Germany. The
Supreme Court rejected both arguments.
12' 6o STAT. 784 (1947), So U. S. C. App. § 32 (Supp. 1948). Although § 32
is cast in discretionary language, one district court has recently held that re-
turn thereunder is a matter of right, so that the Custodian's denial of a claim under
the section is subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act.
Zander v. Clark, 8o F. Supp. 453 (D. D. C. 1948). The Custodian has appealed.
12262 STAT. 1246 (1948), 50 U. S. C. A. Anpl. § 39 (Supp. 1949).
123 See pp. 74.o-42 supra.
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TRADING WITH THE ENEMY ACT
as in the Uebersee case, was whether he could retain it in the face
of an action under Section 9(a). In a curt opinion, the district
court held that, regardless of the incompetent's residence, Sec-
tion 39 forbade the return of his property, and dismissed the com-
plaint.124 In effect, Section 39 was held to have amended Section
9 (a) by adding to the category of "enemies" not only those who
are enemies under Section 2 (as construed by the Uebersee case)
but those who are nationals of enemy countries. Technically, the
holding would seem to make possible the taking and retention of
the property of German and Japanese nationals resident in the
United States; in practice, it may safely be predicted that the
Custodian will not embark upon any such campaign.
The Court's decision in the Uebersee case, by permitting the
Government to look behind the corporate veil, opens new vistas
of "cloaking" litigation. "Cloaking" may be concisely defined as
an attempt to cover enemy property in the United States with a
cloak of apparent nonenemy ownership; and its forms are as
various as the ingenuity of enemy financial and economic experts
would allow - which is very various indeed. For example, real
ownership has been concealed by the use of nominees and the
elaboration of complex holding company structures; and the
stock of the top holding companies is often in the form of bearer
shares, the ownership of which is obviously not easy to trace.
Control was often divorced from ownership and exercised through
options, contractual relationships, possession of vital technical
information, and loyalty (or family relationship) of key person-
nel. 25 Despite the variations of technique, the general patteri
is always the same; the Custodian, having determined that cer-
tain property or interest therein is really beneficially owned or
controlled by an enemy, vests it, and is presently sued under
Section 9(a) by a virtuous and fearfully indignant American
citizen (Swiss corporation, Swedish bank) who alleges acquisi-
tion of all the enemy interest, with no strings attached, long
before the war; and further that the Custodian is arbitrarily, un-
lawfully, and unconstitutionally attempting to confiscate the hard
won property of this same virtuous and indignant American citi-
zen (Swiss corporation, Swedish bank).
t 124 Bellman v. Clark, S. D. N. Y., 1948.
125 See Brief for Petitioner, pp. 14-15, Clark v. Uebersee Finanz-Korporation,
332 U. S. 480 (r947)-
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A highly typical cloaking case was Kind v. Clark, decided by
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 2 6 A large and long-
established German manufacturer owned a subsidiary in the
United States, nominally operated by a closely knit group of de-
scendants of an agent of the German company who had settled
in the United States, but actually controlled by a director of the
German company whose instructions the Americans invariably
followed to the letter. The German company owed the Americans
a sumof money, secured by a pledge of the stock of the American
corporation, which stock was worth much more than the amount
of the debt. In 1939, shortly after the outbreak of war in Europe,
the Germans purported to transfer all the stock outright to the
Americans in exchange for the release of the indebtedness. But
correspondence between the parties showed plainly a secret under-
standing (which they called a "gentlemen's agreement") that the
Americans would hold for and eventually pay over to the Ger-
mans the difference between the true value of the stocks and the
amount of the debt: in other words, that the Germans should
retain their equity in the pledged shares. As the German director
expressed it in one of his letters, the shares were to be transferred
to ostensible American ownership "in order that the enterprises
over there could be saved from a foreign seizure." Unfortunately
- from the standpoint of the American cloaks - the Germans,
who had the national taste for comprehensive records, who did
not foresee the result of the war, and who did not, perhaps, wholly
trust their American confederates, preserved all this interesting
correspondence in files which eventually became available to
American occupation forces. In the light of these records, and
having regard to certain unbusinesslike aspects of the deal con-
sidered as an ordinary commercial transaction, the court of ap-
peals had little difficulty in deciding that the ostensible transfer
was a nullity, because neither party had the intent necessary to
validate the "sale." Consequently the stock was still enemy prop-
erty and fair game for the Custodian. The same result would
have been reached by a slightly different route had the Court de-
cided that the Germans' continued control over the property left
it still enemy property, for the purposes of the Trading with the
Enemy Act. It is noteworthy that prize cases invariably make
126 i61 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U. S. 808 (1947).
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TRADING WITH THE ENEMY ACT
control, rather than common law rules as to passage of title, the
test of the enemy character of property.' 27
All this, of course, was almost a pure question of fact -the
true intent of the parties -and so, in essence, are most of the
reported cloaking cases.'28 But the Government, by petition for
certiorari from the opinion of the court of appeals in the Kind
case,129 attempted to raise a significant question of law. The
court of appeals, while holding the transfer to be a nullity, held
further that the Americans consequently retained their secured
claim against the Germans and hence retained and could enforce
a lien on the property vested by the Custodian 3 0 The Govern-
ment sought to contend, in substance, that the American cloaks
had lost even the right to enforce their original lien. Moreover,
there were fairly strong grounds for this position.
In the first place, suits under Section 9(a) are, by the terms
of that section, "in equity." One who has been engaged in a sin-
cere and industrious effort fraudulently to circumvent an impor-
tant federal statute may well be thought to have dirtied his hands
in the process. There is a solidly established corollary of the
clean-hands doctrine, applied in a variety of situations, that one
who has misused his property in the attempted perpetration
of a fraud cannot invoke the aid of equity to enforce his
rights in that property '' -a doctrine which is applied with
particular breadth and vigor where the public (or the Govern-
ment) is the intended victim of the misconduct, so that "the finan-
cial element of the transaction is not the sole or principal thing
involved." 132 In Standard Oil Co. v. Clark,'1 33 however, the second
12 See, e.g., The Benito Estenger, 176 U. S. 568, 578-79 (i9oo). Judicial use
of control as the test of taxability also affords a parallel. Cf. Helvering v. Clifford,
309 U. S. 331 (1940).
128 For other typical cloaking cases, see Standard Oil Co. v. Markham, 64 F.
Supp. 656 (S. D. N. Y. 1945), aff'd sub nom. Standard Oil Co. v. Clark, x63 F.2d
917 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U. S. 873 (1948); Brassert v. Clark, 162
F.2d 967 (2d Cir. 1947).
129 Clark v. Kind, 332 U. S. 808 ('947).
10 Clark v. Kind, 161 F.2d 36, 47 (2d Cir. '947).
"' Cf., e.g., Milwaukee & Minn. R. R. v. Soutter, 13 Wall. 5,7, 523 (U. S.
x87i); Commonwealth Finance Corp. v. McHarg, 242 Fed. 560, 571 (2d Cir. 1922);
Baldwin v. Short, 125 N. Y. 553, 560, 26 N. E. 928, 929 (189x).
132 Pan American Co. v. United States, 273 U. S. 456, 509 (1927); Worden v.
California Fig Syrup Co., 187 U. S. 516 (i9o3); Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Sup-
piger Co., 314 U. S. 488, 493-94 (X942).
133 163 F.2d 9,7 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U. S. 873 (1948).
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circuit rejected a contention that the plaintiff's unclean hands
deprived it of the right to sue under Section 9(a), pointing out
that "nowhere in the statute is there written any restriction of
the right to the return of property or any enlargement of the
Government's power of seizure because of violation of law in the
claimant's original acquisition of it." 13' But this language re-
ferred to a contention that, even if Standard had genuinely become
the owner of some of the property in suit, through agreements
made long before the war, it had done so as part of a conspiracy
to violate the antitrust laws. In the Standard case, it was not
necessary for the court to consider the effect of unclean hands
acquired in the attempt to cloak enemy property, for, havifig
found that this transaction was a nullity, it could not in any event
return to Standard property of which that corporation had never
become the true owner. A rough analogy to the situation in the
Kind case would have been presented if, for example, Standard -
in order to provide corroborative detail lending verisimilitude to
an otherwise bald and unconvincing transaction - had purported,
in exchange for I. G. Farben's property, to assign to I. G. valuable
patents, and if the Custodian had vested those patents. If the
transaction were a sham, equitable ownership would remain in
Standard; but could it have invoked equitable process to reassert
that ownership? There appears to be no definitive answer to this
question, but one is suggested by an aspect of the court's decision
in the Standard case.
As part of a prior consent decree, the Standard companies had
been ordered to place certain of their patents in an American
corporation, Jasco, Inc., which was declared in the consent decree
to be wholly owned by Standard. In the Section 9(a) suit, Jasco
was found to have been half owned by I. G. Farben, and hence
by the Custodian through his vesting order. Standard thereupon
asked the 9(a) court to direct that the Custodian should not get
any of the royalties from the Standard patents which had been
placed in Jasco by the consent decree. The court of appeals
denied any relief on the ground that Standard's predicament was
the result of its own attempted fraud on the Government. The
hypothetical situation is perhaps more favorable to the Govern-
ment's contention than is the situation in the Kind case, however,
since in the former Standard is attempting to assert the nullity of
134 163 F.2d 917, 926 (2d Cir. 1947).
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TRADING WITH THE ENEMY ACT
its own transaction, whereas in the latter it is the Government
which is asserting that the transfer is void.
This clean-hands principle interlocks neatly with an ancient rule
of prize law - a closely related field - that one who has mis-
used his name and property in order to cloak enemy property
cannot, when the cloak has been thrust aside and the property
seized, recover his own property employed in the "iniquitous ad-
venture." 135 There seems good reason to deal with the subtler
financial blockade runners of modern war in much the same man-
ner. Indeed, Section i6 of the Act 136 provides that any prop-
erty-presumably including American property- "concerned"
in a willful violation of the Act or of the regulations issued there-
under shall be forfeited to the United States. Apparently this
sweeping sanction has never been invoked, but it offers intriguing
possibilities. How much of the property of the Standard Oil Com-
pany of New Jersey, for example, might have been held to be
"concerned" in its unsuccessful efforts to cloak the American
assets of I. G. Farben? The subject is one on which attorneys
for cartel-minded corporations may well pause to ponder.
A collateral question, adumbrated by the decision in the Stand-
ard case, is the status of a nonenemy who has, in effect, been
the agent of an enemy in a cloaking transaction. The executive
order implementing the Act defines "national of a designated
enemy country" to include any person whom the Custodian deter-
mines to be "controlled by or acting for or on behalf of [includ-
ing cloaks for] a designated enemy country or a person within
such country." 13 Thus, Judge Clark indicated, 3 ' Standard's
concealment of I. G. assets after Germany's declaration of war,
might have made it an "enemy" for the purposes of Section 9 (a).
The court's view of the case made the question academic, for
to the extent that Standard genuinely acquired the ownership of
135 See, e.g., The Saint Nicholas, i Wheat. 47, 431 (U. S. 1816); The Fortuna,
3 Wheat. 236, 245 (U. S. i8i8); Carrington v. Merchants Ins. Co., 8 Pet. 495,
520-21 (U. S. 1834).
13840 STAT. 425 (T917), 5o U. S. C. Api. § i6 (1946).
137 Exec. Order No. 9193, par. io(a) (i), 7 FED. REG. 5205 (1942); cf. Exec.
Order No. 8785, par. 5E(iii), 6 FED. REG. 2897 (194), which, for the purposes of
the freezing regulations, in substance defines "foreign national" to include any
person to the extent that he has been acting directly or indirectly for the benefit
of or on behalf of a national of a foreign country.
138See Standard Oil Co. v. Clark, 163 F.2d 917, 925 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied,
333 U. S. 873 (1948).
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HARVARD LAW REVIEW
I. G.'s property, it was acting for itself. But, as above indicated,
if its concealment of I. G. assets had been accomplished in part
through a colorable transfer to I. G. of some of its own United
States property, as was the case in Kind v. Clark, this question,
as well as the problem of the effect of unclean hands, would have
been squarely presented. In at least one case, it has been held
that the Custodian was authorized to seize the stock of an Amer-
ican corporation, owned by an American citizen, but operated by
him in the interest of a German concern. 39
Section 9 (a) raises, or has raised, a number of other questions,
some of which have been laid to rest within the year or so by
legislation. Thus, for example, Section 34 now affords an exclu-
sive method whereby American creditors may reach the vested
assets of enemy debtors, thereby obviating the World War I
provisions of Section 9(a), which authorized suit by such credi-
tors.1 40 Secured creditors, who may be said to have an interest
in the vested property, have still a cause of action under Sec-
tion 9(a), and hence there may be anticipated a rash of suits
under that section alleging the existence of various species of liens
on vested property.'
CONCLUSION
It has been the purpose of this article briefly to outline some
of the intricacies of judicial construction of the Act as it now
stands, rather than to consider potential amendatory legislation.
There is a temptation to end the discussion in facile fashion by
briefly recommending legislation designed to cure all the ills of
the world, or at least that portion of them which arises from the
ambiguities and inconsistencies of the Trading with the Enemy
Act, as amended and judicially construed. Perhaps some such
' Draeger Shipping Co. v. Crowley, 55 F. Supp. 9o6 (S. D. N. Y. 1944).
.40 Prior to the enactment of § 34, Pub. L. No. 671, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946),
the Supreme Court had held that these provisions of § 9(a) had continued vitality,
despite a time limitation contained in § 9(e), which limited claims thereunder to
those owed to or owned by the claimant prior to October 6, 1917. Markham v.
Cabell, 326 U. S. 404 (1945). After the enactment of § 34, Cabell's suit under
§ 9(a) was dismissed on the ground that the new section was the exclusive remedy
for American creditors. Cabell v. Markham, 69 F. Supp. 640 (S. D. N. Y. 1946),
aff'd sub nom. Cabell v. Clark, 162 F.2d 153 (2d Cir. 1947). For a comprehensive
description of the new remedy, see Mason and Efron, The Payment of American
Creditors from Vested Assets, 9 FED. BAR J. 233 (1948).
1411 Cf. Cabell v. Clark, supra note 140.
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legislation is or may be desirable, but I am beginning to suspect
that the complexity and unpredictability of the situations and tac-
tics with which the Act is designed to deal make the filling up of
its interstices a job more suitable to the judicial than to the legis-
lative process. Certainly, a little more judicial uniformity would
be desirable. Judicial interpretation in ten circuits and eighty-odd
districts (not to speak of occasional swipes at the statute by the
courts of the forty-eight states) has proved the hard way to forge
a sword of economic warfare; but it may be the best.
HeinOnline -- 62 Harv. L. Rev. 759 1948-1949
1949] T 759




i l . t tion
'
r ;
